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In this latest work by one of our leading political and legal philosophers, Allen Buchanan outlines a 
novel framework for assessing the system of international human rights law—the system that he 
takes to be the heart of modern human rights practice. Buchanan does not offer a full justification 
for the current system, but rather aims “to make a strong prima facie case that the existing system as 
a whole has what it takes to warrant our support of it on moral grounds, even if some aspects of it 
are defective and should be the object of serious efforts at improvement” (p. 173). 
 The book is brimming with new ideas and insights, and I see three main claims that have 
particularly interesting implications. First, Buchanan argues against what he calls the “Mirroring 
View”: 
 
To justify an international legal human right typically involves defending the claim that a 
corresponding moral human right exists. The qualifier “typically" is designed to 
accommodate the fact that some who hold this view acknowledge that in some cases a 
justified international legal human right does not mirror a moral human right, but is rather 
either (a) a specification of a moral human right . . . or (b) something that is instrumentally 
valuable for realizing a moral human right . . . (p. 17). 
 
Buchanan makes a plausible case that many philosophers working on the moral foundations of 
human rights erroneously assume the Mirroring View, including James Griffin, Joseph Raz, and 
John Tasioulas. He could equally have targeted Carol Gould, Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen or 
Carl  Wellman. Buchanan’s main argument against the Mirroring View starts from the premise that 
any moral right has to be “solely subject-grounded,” that is, it has to be justified by what it does for 
the individual right-holder—where this might involve serving the right-holder's interests, protecting 
her freedom or needs, or the like (p. 59). But many international legal human rights have 
“corresponding duties the fulfilment of which requires large-scale social investment and limitations 
on the liberty of large numbers of people” (p.62). As examples, Buchanan mentions the legal human 
right to health, which requires governments to set up vaccination programs to deliver herd 
immunity, and the legal human right to democracy, which entails duties on governments to hold fair 
elections with appropriate nationwide logistics in place (pp. 61–62).1 Such legal human rights, with 
their demanding corresponding duties, cannot be justified simply by what they do for the individual 
subject. As he writes, “To put the point bluntly: No matter who you are, you are not important 
enough to justify a set of duties that correlate with the panoply of legal rights [protected by 
international human rights law]” (pp.63–64). Buchanan concludes that international legal human 
rights must in most cases be justified by how they serve “the interests and autonomy of large 
numbers of people” (p. 64), and this means that they cannot be grounded as reflecting or 
operationalizing pre-legal moral rights. Thus, the Mirroring View is false. 
Buchanan goes on to outline a plurality of reasons in favor of a system of international legal 
human rights that are independent of pre-legal moral rights: Such a system encourages 
improvements in domestic bills of rights; enhances states’ legitimacy by providing for the 
independent adjudication of claims made against them; supplies doctrinal resources for improving 
the humanitarian law of armed conflict; provides a legal framework for dealing with global 
problems; and makes democracies responsive to the needs of foreigners as well as their own 
citizens. Buchanan claims that the human rights system is a necessary condition on the justifiability 
of the global order of states. This order vests huge power in sovereign states by conferring 
conventional-legal rights of control, rights over resources, and borrowing rights on whatever body 
is in de facto control of a territory; the limits imposed on states by human rights are a minimal 
condition on the justifiability of this system.   
In sketching his range of reasons for having a system of international legal human rights, 
Buchanan takes the system to be defined by two characteristic functions: “(a) helping to ensure that 
each individual has the opportunity to lead a minimally good or decent life (the well-being function) 
and (b) affirming and protecting the equal basic moral status of each individual” (p. 313). Buchanan 
thinks that an international legal system with these two functions can be defended on the grounds he 
offers without appealing to pre-legal moral rights. 
The arguments for the role and importance of the second function regarding equal basic 
status are, I suggest, the second of the book’s three most significant contributions. Buchanan 
believes that ensuring opportunities for minimal wellbeing could be achieved without granting each 
individual equal basic status: for example, it could be achieved in certain caste or patriarchal 
societies. But Buchanan sees the securing of equal basic status as an essential function of 
international human rights law, a function with its own distinct importance. 
The book’s third significant innovation concerns what Buchanan calls the 
“Metacoordination View” of legitimacy.2 This is the view that standards of legitimacy for an 
institution are normative standards that we consider appropriate to require of an institution in order 
for it to merit our respect as a solution to a coordination problem in which serious costs and 
important benefits are at stake. To put it in Buchanan’s words, “institutions cannot generally 
function so as to coordinate our behavior in beneficial ways—or at least cannot do so without 
excessive costs in terms of coercive enforcement—unless enough people can converge in their 
individual judgments as to whether the institution is worthy of support. Criteria of legitimacy serve 
as coordination points to solve this metacoordination problem” (p. 179). 
Legitimacy assessments express “a compromise between the need to have a functioning 
institution and the desire to impose normative requirements on it” (p. 195). Legitimacy in this sense 
is something that we decide to adopt as a standard for a given institution, rather than something that 
is discovered. We decide that such-and-such standards are appropriate to require of an institution if 
it is to merit our respect as an authority in domain so-and-so. What legitimacy standards we should 
impose will depend partly on the nature of the domain (which will make certain purported standards 
of legitimacy inherently unacceptable), but also on our particular concerns, needs, and attitudes 
toward risk in a given context. 
 Two appealing conclusions follow from this general view of legitimacy. First, appropriate 
standards of legitimacy for the state need not be appropriate for nonstate institutions, such as human 
rights institutions. So Buchanan argues, for example, that democratic accountability is not essential 
for the legitimacy of each and every part of the United Nations’ institutional human rights 
apparatus, even if such accountability is necessary for a state’s legitimacy. Similarly, even if 
possession of enforcement power turns out to be essential to a state’s legitimacy, possession of such 
power may not be necessary for the legitimacy of international legal human rights institutions. 
Second and relatedly, the legitimacy of international legal human rights institutions is, as Buchanan 
puts it, an “ecological” matter: that is, the legitimacy of a given institution will depend on how it 
coheres with other institutions, and the legitimacy of the latter will in turn depend on how they 
interact with the first institution. For example, Buchanan suggests that “with respect to the treaty 
drafting groups and the treaty bodies, if we view them in isolation, rather than as elements in a 
broader network that encompasses international, regional, and national institutions, we will 
underestimate their legitimacy” (p. 197). Buchanan is especially doubtful about the legitimacy of 
the Security Council, due primarily to its lack of accountability and transparency, and its failure to 
live up to its public claim to protect against major human rights violations. But Buchanan notes that 
on his view, “the illegitimacy of even an institution as important as the Security Council need not 
undermine the legitimacy of other parts of the system” (p. 203). Following careful investigation he 
concludes that treaty-drafting groups and treaty bodies can qualify as legitimate according to the 
standards appropriate to their functions. 
 
Assessing the argument for the centrality of equal basic status 
 
Each of Buchanan’s three central claims is attractive. The Metacoordination View releases the 
concept of legitimacy from the straitjacket of state-focused theories of political obligation. 
Buchanan’s resulting position makes an institution’s legitimacy significantly harder to assess (in 
that one cannot simply “plug in” a pre-prepared theory of the legitimacy of the state), but the 
flexibility and context-dependence brought by the Metacoordination View feel appropriate to the 
complexity of the legitimacy of international institutions. However, I am skeptical about 
Buchanan’s claim for the centrality of equal basic status to international legal human rights. Of 
course many human rights protect our equal basic status, and of course such equal status is morally 
important. But I am not convinced by Buchanan’s claim that the “minimum well-being” function of 
human rights is independent of the “equal status” function. The argument for this claim is that a 
system of legal rights that secures people’s minimal well-being need not secure equal basic status: 
Some of the major human rights conventions . . . include what I have called strong rights 
against discrimination on grounds of race or gender . . . . These cannot plausibly be 
understood as serving only to ensure the conditions for being able to lead a minimally good 
or decent human life, because people can lead a minimally good or decent human life and 
yet be subject to some forms of discrimination. This would be the case, for example, if well-
paid, educated women receive lower salaries than men, simply because they are women, or 
when highly successful people of color suffer similar “soft” discrimination. Nor is it 
convincing to argue that people cannot lead minimally good or decent lives unless they not 
only have the same rights as others but also have the same rights with the same scope and 
weight and subject to the same conditions of derogation and also have strictly equal access 
to remedies for violations of their rights (p. 89). 
 
The claims in the final sentences above seem correct to me: it is unconvincing to say that 
people cannot lead minimally good lives if they are subject to “soft” discrimination or fail to 
possess the same legal rights as others. But this does not warrant the conclusion that strong equal 
status laws must play a function other than the protection of minimal well-being. Notice that it is 
equally unconvincing to say that people cannot lead minimally good lives if rights that are clearly 
targeted at protecting their wellbeing are violated, or if they lack wellbeing–protecting legal rights. 
For example, some people who are subjected to torture recover and lead minimally good lives 
overall; some people denied wellbeing–protecting legal rights (people in regimes that permit forced 
marriage, for example) also manage to lead minimally good lives. Of course, a large number of 
people whose wellbeing–protecting rights are violated, or who lack such rights, will have their lives 
severely impaired as a result. But not everyone will. Throughout history, a vast number of people 
have had their wellbeing–protecting rights violated, or have lacked legal rights protecting their 
wellbeing. I venture that nonetheless many such people have lived minimally good lives. 
This point does not, I think, undermine Buchanan’s claim that one of the distinctive features 
of human rights is to protect people’s wellbeing. But it undermines the claim that possession of or 
respect for human rights is necessary for a person to possess minimal wellbeing. Legal human 
rights protect wellbeing by making it more likely that people will attain minimal wellbeing, rather 
than by guaranteeing it. But once this point is conceded, Buchanan’s argument for the distinct 
importance of equal status fails. People who suffer soft discrimination might well go on to lead 
minimally good lives, as Buchanan notes; but this is consistent with the thesis that rights against 
such discrimination function to protect minimal wellbeing. No rights with the minimal wellbeing 
function guarantee minimal wellbeing: they simply make such wellbeing more likely. And rights 
against soft discrimination—along with other equal status rights—clearly do this: rights securing 
equal status make it more likely that people will attain minimal wellbeing. On this basis, someone 
who wanted to take the protection of minimal wellbeing as the sole function of human rights law 
seems able to accommodate equal status rights without regarding “securing equal status” as an 
independent function for human rights law.3 
 There might well be other arguments for the conclusion that securing equal basic status is a 
distinct function of human rights law, irreducible to the wellbeing function.  For example, one 
might directly argue that there are strong wellbeing–independent reasons to ensure that each human, 
qua human, has rights to equal basic status. Buchanan touches on such an argument when he makes 
a moral case that all beings who can “participat[e] in practices involving rational accountability” (p. 
137) hold equal fundamental moral status. I have argued, contra Buchanan, that the prominent 
equal status rights in international human rights law do not require such a direct grounding: they 
can be grounded on the importance of securing minimal wellbeing for all. But an independent 
grounding for them might well be attractive nonetheless. 
One could develop Buchanan’s argument for our equal basic moral status as an argument for 
moral rights to equal basic status—moral rights that international human rights law should reflect.  
The idea that international human rights law should reflect or embody moral human rights is the 
Mirroring View, and we should note that while Buchanan rejects its universality, he allows that 
some international legal human rights might be justified in this way—as reflections of pre-legal 
moral rights. His view is, simply, that many other international legal human rights cannot be so 
justified. 
 
Assessing the rejection of the Mirroring View 
 
Isolating and throwing doubt on the Mirroring View is one of Buchanan’s most valuable and 
thought-provoking achievements in this book. How successful is his critique? Two strategies seem 
available to the defender of the Mirroring View. One strategy notes that even for highly demanding 
“positive” rights, such as the human right to health, it is possible to find underlying moral rights that 
are solely subject-grounded, such as a right not to have disease inflicted on one, or a right to non-
burdensome medical assistance in an emergency. Duties entailed by these rights are, I suggest, 
grounded simply on the importance of the individual’s wellbeing or needs, without reference to how 
such duties serve the wider group. The more demanding international legal human rights—with 
their correlative duties to set up vaccination programs and the like—could, on this strategy, be seen 
as somehow expanding on, giving meaning to, or amplifying these underlying moral human rights. 
True, highly demanding duties to develop expensive health care practices across a society cannot be 
“solely subject-grounded,” but they amplify rights that can. 
There are costs to this strategy. For one, it seems to suggest that the more demanding aspects 
of international human rights law (such as the duty to set up vaccination programs) are somehow 
less urgent—because less closely reflective of the underlying moral human right—than the less 
demanding or “negative” aspects, such as the duty not to inflict diseases on people against their 
will. Nonetheless, rejecting the Mirroring View also seems costly. As David Luban notes, in 
responding to Buchanan:  
 
No organization called Transnational Legal Claim Rights Watch, or Transnational Legal 
Claim Rights First, will spring into existence to mobilize shame around their violation. And 
this is not simply a point about the rhetorical force of labels. It is a point about the moral 
importance of these rights, the fact that we place great moral weight on them, because we 
think (rightly or wrongly) that they are closely tied to something basic about humanity as 
such.4 
 
Luban is aware that one could see international legal human rights as justified in “something basic 
about humanity as such” without grounding them in universal pre-legal moral rights, and he is also 
in the end not in favor of the Mirroring View. But his point here is that grounding legal human 
rights in pre-legal moral rights does an especially good job of reflecting the importance we want to 
give legal human rights. 
A second strategy for defending the Mirroring View challenges Buchanan’s premise that all 
pre-legal moral rights must be solely subject-grounded. Perhaps some of my pre-legal moral rights 
are grounded not by what they do for me, but by what they do for others or for me in combination 
with others.5 In my view, this is a difficult line of response. Few—maybe no—morally justified 
legal and conventional rights are solely subject-grounded. Even the seemingly individual-focused 
rights of criminal law are, qua legal rights, grounded not in what they do for a particular individual 
citizen, but rather in what they do for the generic citizen or the generic person subject to law. We 
give right-grounding weight to these roles (‘citizen’, ‘person subject to law’) because so doing 
serves the common good, rather than because it serves the individual right-holder. By contrast, I 
suggest that it is hard to think of pre-legal “natural” rights that are not primarily subject-grounded. 
Our best candidates for pre-legal rights—rights not to be tortured, rights to emergency assistance—
do appear to be groundable in large part by what they do for the specific individual right-holder. 
Your interest in not being tortured, or your need not to be tortured, seems to be the main ground for 
your having a right not to be tortured. Whether this right serves the common good or the public 
interest or anything else beyond you appears independent of its grounding: in the case of torture, 
your interest or need is (normally) sufficient to ground your right. 
This issue is muddied by the fact that a person’s moral status is defined not just by his or her 
pre-legal natural rights but also by his or her morally justified legal and conventional rights. It is a 
moral affront to me when someone paints graffiti on my barn, even though my property rights over 
the barn are (I just assert, contra Locke) legal creations that do not reflect some underlying 
“natural” rights over the barn. Similarly, it is a moral affront to me when duties owed to me in my 
role as lecturer are violated. I am not just the accidental locus for the violation of role-based duties 
owed in a role-based way to me: because these roles are justified, violating them is a violation of 
my moral status. By contrast, Buchanan seems to suggest that morally justified legal duties are 
owed to someone legally without their being owed morally to that person (see especially p. 59).This 
is misleading. Rather, what we owe morally to someone is defined by the morally justified duties 
owed to them, including morally justified legal and conventional duties. 
But even though morally justified legal and conventional duties are owed morally to their 
recipients and define their moral status—and even though such duties will correlate with rights that 
are not solely subject-grounded —this does not help the Mirroring View. For, as suggested earlier, 
pre-legal natural rights still look solely subject-grounded. If this is correct, then—while Buchanan 
might have overstated his case by suggesting that legal duties are not owed morally to legal right-
holders—Buchanan’s argument against the Mirroring View still has force: rights and duties that are 
not solely subject-grounded do indeed seem not to be pre-legal natural rights. And as Buchanan has 
shown, many of the duties of international human rights law cannot be solely subject-grounded. 
This conclusion against the Mirroring View worries me, partly for the reasons outlined by Luban.  
Buchanan’s arguments lay down a challenge to which theorists should respond. 
There are further sections of the book that generate additional challenges that I have not 
mentioned. One is Buchanan’s attractive argument against the thesis that “international human 
rights law and constitutional democracy are incompatible in principle” (p. 245). Another is his 
sketch of the limits of international human rights law—for example, as a means for tackling 
environmental problems (pp. 279–292). Yet another is the claim that an international legal human 
rights regime is not inconsistent with nor need disadvantage “valid collectivist moralities” (p. 257). 
Buchanan suggests that one might expect the latter inconsistency if the Mirroring View were true, 
with its assumption that individuals hold pre-legal moral rights. But without the Mirroring View, 
Buchanan claims that there is no inconsistency between individually held international legal human 
rights and valid collectivist moralities. Buchanan notes that the very idea of rights themselves need 
not be individualistic: even if rights are, as Ronald Dworkin tells us, by nature trumps over appeals 
to social utility, they might thereby function to protect “plausible collectivistic values from one 
extremely implausible collectivistic value, namely, unlimited state power” (p. 262). Buchanan goes 
on: 
 
When the nation-state claims to be the ultimate source of value, all other groups and all 
relationships other than that of abject obedience to it are imperiled. Therefore, it is 
profoundly mistaken to say that the only purpose or even the primary purpose of the 
international legal human rights regime is to protect individuals from the state. A regime of 
international legal human rights would be of great value even if all actual moralities were 
collectivistic (p. 262). 
 
This is highly persuasive, as is the ensuing discussion of how individual rights can often do 
a better job of protecting groups than group rights (pp. 264–66), and of how the seemingly 
individualistic dignity-based preambles to international human rights documents are incompatible 
only with a radical rather than a mild collectivism (pp. 268–69). Part of the value of Buchanan’s 
discussion of collectivistic moralities is that it forces the reader to think carefully about what sort of 
collectivist one would have to be if one wanted to challenge the defensibility of international legal 
rights borne by individuals. My sense is that some critics might want to revisit the concern that the 
very idea of rights is inconsistent with their moral views. Buchanan makes a good job of showing 
that Dworkin’s notion of rights as trumps is not anti-collectivist. But what about the central notion 
that rights foreground[a specific being (individual or group) as “the right-holder”—the being who 
qualifies as “wronged” by a violation? Some anti-individualistic critics might claim that better 
moralities will not involve targeted “wrongable” beings in this way. For example, they might argue 
that using the notion of rights involves erroneously downgrading the status—in relation to a 
particular duty-violation—of those who are not right-holders. Consider an attack on a particular 
person. One line of criticism could be that everyone partakes in victimhood as a result of this act, 
because the act wrongs the whole world: rights language compels us to focus on the specific right-
holder and is in this sense misleading.6 I am not advancing this line of criticism, and no doubt 
superior arguments can be found. Buchanan’s arguments force any such critic to proceed with great 
care. 
I have heard some people question whether international law really is the heart of 
contemporary human rights: What of activism, journalism, academia, or the bills of rights in 
national constitutions? What of the fact that many international legal human rights practitioners take 
themselves to be implementing natural moral rights? However one approaches these questions, 
Buchanan’s book will remain of very great value for showing, in clear language starting from 
plausible premises, how the international legal human rights regime can be defended without appeal 
to pre-legal moral rights. International human rights law is a surprising and fragile modern legal 
development. Buchanan’s persuasive, thought-provoking defense of it is essential reading for 
anyone working in the area. 
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